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Abstract 
This paper provides a preliminary assessment of the EU’s energy policy under the 
Treaty of Lisbon rules. It reviews the major and minor effects of the rules on energy 
(both formally and informally) and how these are perceived by the EU institutions 
post-Lisbon.  This  includes  consideration  of  the  new  elements  of  the  reformed 
institutional architecture in this policy area. In the context of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the main questions this paper seeks to answer are to what extent energy policy 
constitutes a new policy area and whether the EU is a more coherent actor in this 
and other instances where competence is shared with the member states.  
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EU ENERGY POLICY UNDER  
THE TREATY OF LISBON RULES 
BETWEEN A NEW POLICY AND BUSINESS AS USUAL 
EPIN WORKING PAPER NO. 31/FEBRUARY 2011 
JAN FREDERIK BRAUN
* 
Introduction 
The continuing significance of the Union’s energy policy in combination with the Treaty of 
Lisbon rules makes it relevant to assess its state of play from within the main EU institutions. A 
significant question that has so far been minimally explored is the extent to which EU energy 
policy under the Treaty of Lisbon rules constitutes a new policy area or remains ‘business as 
usual’. 
This paper argues that amidst the institutional dust settling in 2010, certain trends are becoming 
apparent in EU energy policy. These trends apply to the energy policy-making process as well 
as to the wider area of shared competences between the Union and the member states. These 
trends include  
•  the revised role division/authorities; 
•  the  increasing  importance  of  confidence  building  and  personal  relations  within  and 
between the institutions; and  
•  the differing perceptions/interpretations within the institutions of the post-Lisbon political 
landscape. 
First,  we  present  an  overview  of  the  energy-related  issues  pertaining  to  the  Lisbon  Treaty. 
Second, we give an overview of the state of play in energy policy under the Treaty of Lisbon 
rules. While being an early and therefore inevitably speculative assessment of EU energy policy 
under the Treaty of Lisbon rules, we focus here on both the formal and informal effects along 
with the trends that have been noted from within the major European institutions. Finally, in the 
conclusions, we assess the overall state of play of the EU’s energy policy with reflections on the 
European integration process at large.  
1.  Le régime constitutionnel 
A conspicuous change in European primary law has been the inclusion of a specific chapter on 
energy. More specifically, Art. 194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU or ‘Lisbon Treaty’) (co-decision and qualified majority voting) sets out the four main 
aims of the EU’s energy policy: 
•  to ensure the functioning of the energy market;  
•  to ensure the security of supply in the Union; 
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•  to promote energy efficiency and energy saving, and develop new and renewable forms 
of energy; and 
•  to promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
These aims, as the new Art. 122(1) TFEU stipulates, are to be executed in a spirit of solidarity, 
whereby  
[w]ithout prejudice to any other procedure provided for in the Treaties, the Council, 
on a proposal from the Commission, may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between the 
Member States, upon measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if 
severe  difficulties  arise  in  the  supply  of  certain  products,  notably  in  the  area  of 
energy. 
On the one hand, this provision confirms the Union’s competence to adopt preventive measures 
to avoid security threats and may provide a basis for political backing for more far-reaching 
preventive measures in the future.
1 With no legal obligation on the member states, however, 
solidarity remains weak. A prime example in this regard is Regulation No. 994/2010/EU on the 
security of gas supply that was adopted at the end of 2010.
2 This Regulation was proposed 
largely in response to episodes like the Ukraine–Russia dispute, where the solidarity aspect had 
to  be  improved.  While  leading  to  a  more  harmonised  and  consistent  implementation  of 
measures for the security of gas supply and to a higher degree of preparedness in most member 
states,  it  achieves  little  regarding  solidarity  amongst  the  member  states  beyond  what  could 
already be done on a voluntary, bilateral basis.  
Furthermore, from a Union perspective, Art. 194 TFEU entails prominent legal shortcomings. 
Art. 194(2) and (3) TFEU stipulate that measures in the field of energy taxation and member 
states’  rights  in  deciding  on  the  conditions  for  exploiting  their  energy  resources,  choices 
amongst different energy sources and the general structure of their energy supply are subject to 
unanimity.  In  addition,  member  states  retain  the  right  to  conduct  their  bilateral  (energy) 
relations with non-EU countries as they see fit, although these relations are subject to general 
obligations of sincere cooperation and competition rules apply, for example, to the import and 
transit of energy.
3 Finally, the substance of the Euratom Treaty has remained unchanged. This is 
important, as about a quarter of the electricity in Europe is generated by nuclear power plants.  
In short, the inclusion of a dedicated title and legal basis in the Lisbon Treaty is described here 
as formalising the shared ownership of EU energy policy between the EU institutions and the 
member states in terms of “[a] carefully crafted compromise between national sovereignty over 
national resources and energy taxation issues, and a shared Union competence for the rest”.
 4  
In the area of external action, the Lisbon Treaty introduces some notable changes that could 
affect the politics of energy between the Union and the member states. Concerning external 
representation, Art. 17(1) TEU states that “[w]ith the exception of the common foreign and 
security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, [the Commission] shall ensure the 
Union’s external representation”. In the context of external action, Art. 21(2) TEU states that 
the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions and shall work towards a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations. This includes (2f) amongst others 
“[h]elp  [to]  develop  international  measures  to  preserve  and  improve  the  quality  of  the 
environment and the sustainable management of global resources in order to ensure sustainable 
                                                      
1 See Andoura et al. (2010).  
2 See Regulation (EU) No. 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 
concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC, OJ 
L 295/1, 12.11.2010.  
3 The Regulation on the security of gas supply, for example, has a legal basis in Art. 194(2) TFEU.  
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development”.
5 In carrying out these and other measures, and ensuring consistency amongst the 
different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies, Art. 21(3) TEU 
states that “[t]he Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that 
effect”. Art. 218(3) TFEU supports the assumption that in agreements that are exclusively or 
principally related to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), there is (still) a role 
carved out for the Council and hence the member states and their national energy policies.
6  
Besides being a dedicated title in the Treaty, energy constitutes a horizontal policy issue. In this 
regard, the EU’s energy policy is a component of other policy areas, such as  
•  foreign  policy ( e . g .  l i n k e d  t o  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  l o n g -term 
relationships with supply and transit countries through a ‘package approach’);
7 
•  environment/climate  change ( e . g .  a  key  element  in  reducing  CO2  and  stimulating 
investments in renewables); and 
•  competition ( e . g .  a c c e s s  t o  a f f o r d a b l e  e n e r g y  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  e n s u r i n g  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
competitiveness of European industries). 
A view expressed in the Council and Commission is that the EU’s (horizontal) energy policy 
should be part of a bigger package and that the Lisbon Treaty should help in formulating such 
packages.
8 
Despite  its  crosscutting s e c t o r a l  n a t u r e , t h e  l e g a l  b a s e  u s e d  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  U n i o n ’ s  
external dimension of the energy policy formally falls within Art. 194 TFEU. Yet, there still 
seems to be a certain ambiguity about which Treaty legal base to use in external action on 
energy and where to draw the line in the mix of the Union’s and member states’ competences.
9 
Moreover, this is accompanied by a rather hybrid negotiating format. Of additional importance 
is the introduction of Art. 218(6) TFEU on the conclusion of international agreements, which 
now require the consent of the European Parliament. We further reflect on both these matters 
below.  
2.  The politics of energy under the Treaty of Lisbon rules: Between a 
new policy and business as usual 
Several  claims  are  going  around  about  the  political  consequences  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  A 
popular view in the Council of Ministers is that the Treaty “[r]einforces the trend within the EU 
towards t h e  e m e r g e n c e  of  a  commanding  European  Council,  a  confident  Council  and 
Parliament  sharing  legislative  responsibility,  and  a  politically  constrained  Commission”.
10 
Others emphasise that the European Parliament and the European Council have been promoted 
by the Treaty as the Union’s primary poles of power, with the Commission and the Council of 
                                                      
5 Emphasis added by author. 
6 Art. 218(3) TFEU states that the Council, based on recommendations from the Commission or high 
representative, shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and nominate the Union 
negotiator or head of the Union’s negotiating team.  
7 T h e s e  i n c l u d e  s u p p l y  a n d  t r a n s i t  c o u n t r i e s , s u c h  a s  R u s s i a ,  U k r a i n e  a n d  A z e r b a i j a n .  A  ‘ p a c k a g e  
approach’ wraps up certain issues in more comprehensive negotiations linking deal-making in energy 
issues, for example, to visa arrangements.  
8 Derived from interviews 1 and 3 on 28 June 2010.  
9 Derived from an interview on 21 June 2010. 
10 See Dinan (2010). 4 | JAN FREDERIK BRAUN 
 
Ministers weakened – at least in their respective political roles.
11 A relevant question here is 
whether or to what extent these claims are valid in the area of EU energy policy. Therefore, we 
focus here on reviewing the effects – major and minor as well as formal and informal – on 
energy policy and how these are perceived within the institutional quadrangle. 
2.1  The European Council 
As spelled out in the Treaty (Arts. 15(1) and 22(1) TEU), the European Council identifies the 
strategic  interests  and  objectives  of  the  Union.  Concerning  external  action,  the  European 
Council as a whole identifies interests and takes decisions, for example, concerning a specific 
country or in thematic areas such as energy.
12 Hence as a provider of strategic direction, the 
European Council and its President (POTEC) Herman Van Rompuy, are formally excluded in 
the legislative process on energy. Nevertheless, and largely according to its role definition in the 
Lisbon  Treaty,  the  POTEC  has  made  efforts  to c r e a t e  a  distinct  profile  in  non-legislative 
processes, s u c h  as  the  EU  2020  strategy, w h i l e  h a v i n g  a u t o n o m o u s l y  i n i t i a t e d  a  t h e m a t i c  
discussion on energy at the European Council meeting in February 2011. This initiative by the 
POTEC has been hailed by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER). As 
a  senior  official  at t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s t a t e d, “ [ V a n  R o m p u y ’ s  c a l l ]  has  created  political 
momentum and added a much-desired political face next to the more technocratic aspects of 
negotiations on energy”.
13  
On the other hand, the European Council’s increased institutional and political stature in energy 
policy should not be overestimated. Stated differently, the suggestion made by Kaczynski et al. 
(2010)  of  a  “European-Councilisation  of  European  politics”,  i.e.  a  marginalisation  and 
subversion of the Commission and the Council of Ministers, seems to be an exaggeration in this 
policy dossier. First, as defined in the Treaty (Art. 15(1) TEU), the European Council provides 
political impetus while not exercising legislative functions. Hence the European Council has 
limited  ownership,  especially  in  highly  technical  and  complex  policy  dossiers  like  energy. 
Therefore this institution relies on the unmatched expertise within the Commission and Council 
(sectoral) machinery for further developing the broad political strokes set in its conclusions. 
Finally, its limited institutionalisation keeps the European Council from ‘hijacking’ European 
politics.  A  recent  suggestion  by V a n  R o m p u y ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  
meetings from “twice every six months” (Art. 15(3) TEU) to once a month was rejected by the 
heads of state and government.
14  
2.2  The European Commission 
In line with the formalisation of the EU’s competence in energy policy in the Lisbon Treaty, the 
new DG ENER is part of a ‘re-compartmentalisation’ scheme meant to address inconsistencies, 
overlap and gaps in the Commission’s governance of energy.
15 Yet the extent to which this 
puzzle has been solved remains to be seen. Concerning the external dimension of energy, for 
instance,  competence  in  these  areas  falls  under  the  mandate  of  Commissioner  Günther 
                                                      
11 See the Joint Study of the European Policy Centre, Egmont and the Centre for European Policy Studies 
by Kaczy!ski et al. (2010). 
12 See the speech by Herman Van Rompuy (2010) on “The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World” 
at the Collège d’Europe in Bruges on 25 February. 
13 Derived from an interview on 3 June 2010. 
14 Derived from an interview on 25 June 2010. 
15 Andoura et al. (2010) point out that in the area of energy sustainability, for example, matters are dealt 
with by different DGs (such as the DGs for Transport, Energy, Environment, Competition and Tax), each 
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Oettinger.
16 This means that on projects of ‘European interest’, such as the Southern Corridor 
and the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the commissioner for energy takes the lead while the high 
representative for the Union in foreign affairs and security policy plays second fiddle. A senior 
official  at t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s t a t e d  t hat  “[Baroness  Catherine  Ashton]  can  promote  certain 
European  preferences  in  energy  linked  to  specific  regional  and  third-country  dossiers,  but 
ENER takes the lead and final decision”.
17 
In  the  EU’s e x t e r n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f o r  f u r t hering  cooperation  and  dialogue w i t h  non-EU 
countries  and  regions,  however,  a  hybrid  negotiating  format  has  been  put  in  place.  The 
negotiation team here is tripartite: the high representative and the energy commissioner flanked 
by the presidency of the Council of the European Union. A clear example in this regard is the 
EU–US Energy Council, which was established in November 2009.
18 During a summit of this 
Council  in  November  2010,  the  EU  was  represented  by  High  Representative  Ashton  with 
energy Commissioner Oettinger in a secondary role. 
The recent Energy 2020 strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy proposed by the 
Commission furthermore underlines that the external dimension of EU energy policy must be 
consistent and mutually reinforcing with other external activities of the EU (e.g. trade, climate 
change and biodiversity, and the CFSP). In matters of energy security, the strategy states that 
“EU policy will pay particular attention to safety and security of oil, natural gas pipelines and 
related  production  and  transport  infrastructure  by  combining  energy  policy  and  CFSP 
instruments”.
19 In sum, both the hybrid negotiating format plus the Energy 2020 strategy on the 
external  dimension  of  energy  indicate  that  while  trying  to  solve  the  puzzle  of  institutional 
fragmentation, the Commission – and the EU at large – promotes increasing synergies in the 
horizontal energy dossier.  
At  the  same  time,  the  practice  of  sorting  out  who  should  take  the  lead  in  international 
negotiations  on  energy-related  areas a n d  w h e r e  t h e  U n i o n  a n d  n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  s h a r e  
competence  is  proving  to  be  a  hard  nut  to  crack.  A  much-publicised e x a m p l e  was t h e  
negotiating mandate for the UN Environment Programme on addressing mercury in 2010. This 
battleground between the Commission and the Council of Ministers over the rules for the EU’s 
external representation was not so much a legal as a political conflict.
20 From the Council side, 
the Commission’s claim that only it can represent the Union – while viewed as politically the 
most reasonable option in the long term – was perceived as pursuing an institutional collision 
course.
21 The Commission criticised the Council for undermining efforts to put into practice the 
Union’s mantra of ‘speaking with one voice’ in international relations.
22 
                                                      
16 Derived from an interview on 21 May 2010. Both Commission President José Manuel Barroso and 
energy Commissioner Oettinger made a case for the inclusion of the external dimension of energy under 
DG ENER, thereby excluding the possibility of powers in this area being ‘siphoned’ off to the European 
External Action Service. 
17 Derived from an interview on 28 June 2010. 
18  See  Council  of  the  European  Union  (2009).  The  members  of  the  Energy  Council  are  the  high 
representative flanked by the commissioners for energy, science and research plus the presidency of the 
Council of the European Union.  
19 See European Commission (2010). 
20 Derived from an interview on 26 May 2010. 
21 Derived from interviews on 16 April, 27 May and 28 May 2010. 
22 See Council of the European Union (2010). In summary, the final compromise text states that the 
Commission is authorised to negotiate on behalf of the Union in matters that fall within the Union’s 
competence. To the extent that the subject matter falls within the shared competence of the Union and of 
its member states, the Commission and the member states should cooperate closely during the negotiating 6 | JAN FREDERIK BRAUN 
 
Without going into the details of this case, two lessons are drawn here. First, post-Lisbon what 
is  needed  in  areas  of  shared  competence  like t h e s e  i s  c o n f i d ence  building  between  the 
Commission and the member states. A view expressed from the Council Secretariat is that the 
Commission should present arguments that convince the member states to provide a mandate 
for negotiating on national competences [plus] make clear to them that they have control over 
the negotiating mandate.
23 This requires diplomatic skill in winning over the member states. 
Also, bickering should not take place with respect to competence; discussions should instead 
focus on effectiveness. Questions of ‘who represents the EU’ and ‘who drives the EU’ are 
clearly linked to desires by the Commission to establish a distinct European identity in global 
governance while reducing the Union’s ‘patchwork power’ status in this area.
24 In patching up 
this state of affairs, a director of the Commission’s Services argued that “[the Commission] 
should make a case to the member states that, en bloc, the member states and the Commission 
are  much  more  effective  in  international  negotiations  that i n v o l v e  b o t h  E U  and  national 
competences”.
25  
2.3  The Council of Ministers 
To a large extent the energy dossier is business as usual in the Council, i.e. there is a strong 
continuity between presidencies in pushing legislation through the Council machinery.  
It is noticeable that during the heyday of the six-month presidency, which drew to a close in the 
first half of 2010, certain tensions between the Council of Ministers and the Commission in the 
external dimension of energy rose to the surface. These came to the fore in the aforementioned 
EU–US Energy Council. Owing to agreements made previously at a higher political level – the 
Energy Council was initiated by US Ambassador Richard Morningstar – DG RELEX (now 
External Action) was awarded the lead role in this dossier. This fait accompli can be regarded as 
an inheritance from the pre-Lisbon era.  
Just as in the above-mentioned mercury case, a new sovereign attitude by the Commission in 
the Energy Council has been noted in the Council of Ministers, with respect to both the member 
states and the rotating presidency. Complaints in the Council of Ministers have included last-
minute annotated agendas by DG RELEX/External Action on non-relevant subjects, a regular 
denial of information by the latter and an unsatisfactory degree of transparency in the policy-
making  process.  This  situation d o e s  n o t  s e e m  t o  b e  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  E U ’ s  i n t e r n a l  
working  methods  in  the  Energy  Council,  which  read  that  “[t]he  Commission  will  report 
regularly to the Member States on its exchanges with the United States on this matter and will 
forward the agenda to them”.
26 In line with aforementioned arguments, the Commission defends 
its ‘new professionalism’ on the grounds of avoiding institutional overcrowding in this area plus 
limiting  the  opportunities  for  member  states  to  insert  national  standpoints  in  Commission 
proposals.  This  attitude  is  questioned  by t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  Mi n i s t e r s ,  wh e r e  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
Council’s Energy Working Party underlines that the Commission has little margin to act alone. 
It needs to cooperate with the Council presidency and the European Parliament for effective 
policy-making.
27 In accordance with the formal working methods described above, there have 
                                                                                                                                                           
process, “with a view to aiming for unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member 
States”. 
23 Derived from an interview on 27 May 2010. 
24  See  Pisani-Ferry  (2005)  as  cited  in  Gstöhl  (2009).  The  term  ‘patchwork’ r e f e r s  t o  t h e  E U  a s  a n 
accidental  player,  i.e.  one  that  – d e p e n d i n g  o n  i t s  i n t e r n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  o r  t h e  l a c k  o f  t h e m   – i s  
sometimes at the table and sometimes not. 
25 Derived from an interview on 3 June 2010. 
26 Refer to Council of the European Union (2009). 
27 Derived from an interview on 8 July 2010. EU ENERGY POLICY UNDER THE TREATY OF LISBON RULES | 7 
 
been calls in the Council for consultations ex ante between the Commission and the Council 
(i.e. the presidency and member states) in an open and transparent way.  
2.4  The European Parliament 
Concerning energy policy, the main provision in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 194 TFEU) has been 
hailed within the Parliament as a point of departure for further extending the EU institutions’ 
power. 
At the same time, the previously mentioned limitations of the separate energy title in the Lisbon 
Treaty have been described by officials in the Parliament’s secretariat as a double-edged sword. 
“On the one hand, paragraph 1 [Art. 194] proposes opportunities [for] the Parliament while 
paragraph 2 sets limitations. The role of the EP [European Parliament] is to exploit the first 
paragraph and use it to the best of its abilities.”
28 
The introduction of Art. 218(6a) TFEU on the conclusion of international agreements is of more 
importance for enhancing the Parliament’s role in energy matters. In these agreements, covering 
fields  to  which  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure  applies,  the  consent  of  the  European 
Parliament is now required.
29 In energy projects of European interest, such as Nabucco and the 
Southern Corridor, no agreements can be established without the permission of the Parliament. 
Furthermore,  Art.  218(6a)  provides  for  the  Parliament  to  have a  p r e s e n c e  in  international 
organisations and conventions like the International Energy Agency, the Energy Charter Treaty 
and the Energy Community.
30  
Nevertheless, enabling the Parliament to use fully its new prerogatives requires a redefinition of 
the  inter-institutional  relations.  Take  the  Parliament’s  place  in  international  agreements,  for 
example. The Treaty provides that the Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all 
stages of the procedure.
31 Hence for this reason, the Commission and the Council’s rotating 
presidency are obliged to brief the Parliament regarding the latest developments in international 
negotiations. On the other hand, that does not mean that MEPs can attend Council working 
group meetings on the spot in international negotiations, for which the Parliament has been 
pressing.
32 These demands by the Parliament in general go further than the practice of national 
parliaments in national contexts. If it pushes too far, for example by micro-managing a policy 
process  that s h o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  b e  l ed  by  the  executive,  the  Parliament  risks  confusing  the 
distinction between the legislative and executive authorities. 
Another matter concerns problems of coordination between the Industry, Research and Energy 
and  Foreign  Affairs  Committees  in  several  energy  dossiers, s u c h  a s  t h e  third  package  of 
legislative measures on the internal energy market. In this and other legislative proposals, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee wants to carve out a strong role for the high representative.
33 An 
additional matter concerns the recently adopted gas security Regulation. During the negotiations 
on  this  legislative p r o p o s a l ,  t h e  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  C o m m i t t e e  ( u n s u c c e s s f u l l y )  p r o p o s e d  t e x t  
amendments in which they pleaded for a substantial role for the high representative in several 
areas.  
                                                      
28 Derived from an interview on 25 June 2010. 
29 The ordinary legislative procedure applies to most of the energy proposals. 
30 In the International Energy Agency, the Union participates, while in the Energy Charter Treaty, the 
Union is a fully-fledged member.  
31 See Art. 218(10) TFEU. 
32 Derived from an interview on 20 April 2010.  
33 Derived from interviews with officials of the European Parliament and Council of Ministers, February–
July 2010. 8 | JAN FREDERIK BRAUN 
 
3.  Conclusions 
To a large extent, EU energy policy under the Treaty of Lisbon rules remains business as usual. 
The carefully formulated, new energy provisions in primary law, which formalise the shared 
ownership of this policy field, offer little that will move intergovernmental topics into the Union 
arena, hence neglecting to reinforce aspects like solidarity. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty 
offers new means in external representation to further the Union’s cooperation and dialogue 
with non-EU countries and regions. As the Union is looking at energy matters beyond the 
internal  market a n d   towards  presenting  a  political  face  to  the  external  dimension,  the  new 
institutional  actors  initiated  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty, s u c h  a s  the  high  representative a n d  t h e  
European  Council  president, a r e  w e l c o m e  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .  S o  w h e n  r e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  a b o v e -
mentioned question of whether the Commission and the Council of Ministers are ‘squeezed in’ 
between the ‘winners of Lisbon’, i.e. the European Parliament and the European Council, in the 
EU’s energy policy this is not the case.  
Coordination and international representation in energy policy has nevertheless become more 
complex and not necessarily more effective post-Lisbon. The division of labour in the external 
dimension  of  energy  amongst  the  European  Commission,  the  high  representative a n d   the 
rotating Council presidency – with consent required by the Parliament – is not as clear-cut as 
the (political reality of the) Treaty puts it. This confusion can, for example, provide fertile 
ground for competing approaches to markets and politics amongst the Commission’s services, 
the Council Secretariat and the European External Action Service. In this vein, Vice-President 
of the Commission Maros Sefcovic recently stated that within the EU, commentators love to see 
the institutions in permanent competition – a zero-sum game that means that whatever one 
institution gains, the other inevitably loses.
34 
To avoid excessive bureaucratic politics and build on the legal basis of the Lisbon Treaty to 
ensure that, for instance, there is effective solidarity in the infrastructure and external dimension 
of energy, the combined politico-technical expertise and weight of the institutional quadrangle 
is required to ‘play in tune’. Instances of shared competence like that for energy, which are at 
the same time both horizontal and sectoral, have proven just how much the institutions depend 
on  each  other  under  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  rules.  Thus t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  E n e r g y  2 0 2 0  
Communication stresses that more effective coordination at the EU and member state levels 
needs to be put in place.
35 The mercury case shows that after a phase of inter-institutional 
conflict between the Union’s institutions and the member states, outcomes emerge – in this case 
on who negotiates for the EU in areas of complex shared competence – that look workable on 
the international stage.  
Therefore, in explaining these and other areas of shared competence like that for energy, we 
should abandon the practice of describing them under the Treaty of Lisbon rules in terms of the 
Community method versus intergovernmentalism. Instead, as recently suggested by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, we should explain the EU’s energy policy in terms of a new ‘Union 
method’, i.e. a combination of the Community method and coordinated action by the member 
states.
36 As the section on energy in the Lisbon Treaty specifies, member states retain their right 
to frame their national energy policies. Yet in responding to common concerns, such as ensuring 
 
                                                      
34 See the speech by the European Commission Vice-President Maros Sefcovic (2011) on “The EU’s 
institutional evolution since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty”, at the Bureau of European 
Policy Advisors in Brussels on 9 February. 
35 Refer to European Commission (2010). 
36 See the speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel (2010) at the opening ceremony of the 61
st 
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a well-functioning internal market in energy and security of supply, along with implementing 
the priority European infrastructure projects, the EU needs coordinated action. This process 
entails a commitment from the institutions and the member states to European cooperation: 
reaching consensus on the energy targets to be achieved followed by action in the respective 
areas, while all work towards the same goal of delivering them.  
It is in this institutional setting under the Treaty of Lisbon rules that the Union must achieve a 
coordinated energy policy.   
10 |  
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Appendix. Title XXI on Energy (Art. 194 TFEU) 
 
Title XXI: Energy, Art. 194  
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy 
shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: 
(a)  ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
(b)  ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
[*] 
(c)  promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy; and 
(d)  promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
2.  Without  prejudice  to  the  application  of  other  provisions  of  the  Treaties,  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives 
in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Such measures shall not 
affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c). 
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure, shall unanimously and after consulting the European 
Parliament, establish the measures referred to therein when they are primarily of a 
fiscal nature. 
* Subject to a procès-verbal of rectification under examination. 
 About EPIN 
 
EPIN is a network of European think tanks and policy institutes with members in almost 
every member state and candidate country of the European Union. It was established in 2002 
during the constitutional Convention on the Future of Europe. Then, its principal role was to 
follow  the  works  of  the  Convention.  More  than  30  conferences  in  member  states  and 
candidate countries were organised in the following year.  
With the conclusion of the Convention, CEPS and other participating institutes decided to 
keep the network in operation. EPIN has continued to follow the constitutional process in all 
its phases: (1) the intergovernmental conference of 2003-2004; (2) the ratification process of 
the  Constitutional  Treaty;  (3)  the  period  of  reflection;  and  (4)  the  intergovernmental 
conference of 2007. Currently, EPIN follows (5) the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty 
and – should the treaty enter into force – (6) the implementation of the Treaty. 
Since 2005, an EPIN Steering Committee takes the most important decisions. Currently there 
are six member institutes: CEPS, DIIS (Denmark), ELCANO (Spain), HIIA (Hungary), Notre 
Europe (France) and SIEPS (Sweden). 
Status quo 
Currently there are 30 EPIN members from 26 countries, also from countries outside of the 
EU. The 'hard core' work of the network is based on the cooperation of about 10 most active 
institutes.  The  member  institutes  are  quite  diverse  in  size  and  structure,  but  are  all 
characterised by political independence and the absence of any predetermined point of view 
or political affiliation. 
EPIN organises two major conferences in Brussels per year; as well as ad hoc conferences or 
other activities in member states. The network publishes Working Paper Series and other 
papers,  which  primarily  focus  on  institutional reform  of  the  Union.  The  network  follows 
preparations for the European elections, the EU’s communication policy, and the political 
dynamics after enlargement, as well as EU foreign policy and justice and home affairs. 
Achievements 
EPIN  is  a  network  that  offers  its  member  institutes  the  opportunity  to  contribute  to  the 
'European added-value' for researchers, decision-makers and citizens. The network provides a 
unique  platform  for  researchers  and  policy  analysts  to  establish  personal  links,  exchange 
knowledge and collaborate on EU-related issues. Members bring their national perspectives to 
bear on the issues tackled and through collaboration they contribute to establish a 'European 
added-value' (e.g. on EU communication, flexible integration). By doing so they strengthen a 
common European dimension in the national debates on Europe. 
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